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In Defence of Animal Homosexuality
Pieter R. Adriaens∗
Is there such thing as animal homosexuality? I begin this paper with a brief discussion
of two case studies of homosexual behaviour in nonhuman animals, notably cockchafers
and king penguins, in order to reveal the persistent attempts of some animal scientists to
explain away animal homosexuality. I then go on to identify and analyse two philosoph-
ical concerns underlying these attempts: the problem of other minds and the problem of
anthropomorphism. Critics of animal homosexuality seem to assume a) that there is no
way of knowing whether nonhuman animals have minds; b) that even if they would in fact
have minds, they still would not be capable of having the mental states that we usually
associate with human homosexuality; and c) that even if they were capable of such states,
there would still be the issue that same-sex sexual mental states and behaviours are often
mistakenly identified as sexual states and behaviours. By providing arguments against each
of these assumptions, I support the claim that some animals exhibit homosexuality, that
there are homosexual mental states in at least some nonhuman animals, and that these
states may help to explain homosexual behaviours.
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1 Introduction
When it comes to humans, ‘homosexuality’ refers to a variety of characteristics, ranging from
sexual behaviours, desires, preferences, and orientations, to sexual identities (Stein 1999). The
question driving this paper is whether, and to what extent, it is justified to also ascribe such
characteristics to nonhuman animals. Scientific opinions are divided on this issue, ranging
from militantly positive (e.g., Bagemihl 1999; Roughgarden 2009) to cautiously positive (e.g.,
Sommer and Vasey 2006; Poiani 2010) to markedly negative (e.g., Stein 1999; Fausto-Sterling
2000), with many in between suggesting we should at least change the vocabulary (e.g., Gowaty
1982; Bailey and Zuk 2009).
One aim of this paper is to reveal two philosophical issues underlying this scientific discord.
First of all, the problem of other minds entails that it is impossible to know whether nonhuman
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animals are minded at all, since we don’t have direct access to the mind of any other living being
except ourselves. The implication of this first problem is that it is safer to provide mechanistic
rather than mentalistic explanations for animal behaviours, including homosexual behaviours.
Secondly, there is the problem of anthropomorphism, of which I discuss two variants, following
a distinction made by Fisher (1996). Categorical anthropomorphism argues that it would be
a category mistake to ascribe homosexual mental states to nonhuman animals, simply because
they aren’t capable of having the mental states that we, humans, usually associate with human
homosexuality, such as desires, preferences, orientations, and identities. Situational anthropo-
morphism holds that at least some animal homosexual behaviours and mental states shouldn’t
be labeled as homosexual, because they aren’t sexual in the first place.
I offer solutions for each of these problems—solutions which, I believe, provide sufficient
grounds to construct a defence of animal homosexuality. More specifically, I defend a) the use
of the expression ‘animal homosexuality’, as well as its many derivatives, in the animal sciences;
b) positing the existence of homosexual mental states in at least some nonhuman animals; and
c) considering such states in explaining observed homosexual behaviours.
Why is it important to defend these three claims? First of all, putting them on the agenda
requires us to provide much-needed semantic and conceptual clarity in the domain of animal
homosexuality. Deciding, for example, whether it makes sense to continue talking about homo-
sexual activities in non-human animals, requires deciding what exactly counts as homosexuality
and what is sexual about it. Providing conceptual clarity is one of the ways in which philosophy
can make itself useful for the sciences (Laplane et al. 2019). Another way to make itself useful
is to critically question and evaluate scientific assumptions. One of the (tacit) assumptions in
research on animal homosexuality is that mechanistic explanations of homosexual behaviours in
animals are somehow superior to mentalistic explanations. In consequence, the latter are rarely
considered, which makes it very hard to compare the strenghts and weaknesses of both kinds of
explanations. Thirdly and finally, debating the existence of mental states in non-human animals,
including homosexual mental states, is important for moral reasons. Each and every ethical the-
ory ascribing moral interests or rights to non-human animals, does so on the assumption that
they have certain mental states, such as the ability to feel pain. Conversely, if it is true that
non-human animals have little or no mental life, then there is no good reason to include them
in our moral community. Lacking moral interests and rights, they become prey to indifference
and, at worst, abuse (Rowlands 2009; Despret 2016).
I conclude this introduction with two disclaimers. First, my focus in this paper is on male
homosexuality, for various reasons. Recent research shows that there are numerous differences
between human male and female homosexuality (for an overview, see Bailey et al. 2016). On
a behavioural level, for example, human male homosexuals are more sexually active and less
monogamous than female homosexuals. The latter’s sexual orientation has also been shown to
be more fluid, i.e., changing over time on a Kinsey scale. It seems reasonable to expect these
differences to also occur in the context of non-human animals, and so to limit the scope of this
paper, I decided to focus on homosexuality in male non-human homosexuality. It would be an
interesting addition, however, to explore the vicissitudes of female homosexuality in the animal
sciences, especially as it seems that mentalistic explanations for female homosexual behaviour
are less problematic than for male homosexual behaviour. Vasey has argued, for example, that
one should at least consider the role of sexual attraction and sexual pleasure in explaining female
behaviours, such as mounting and ventro-ventral contact, in Japanese macaques (Vasey 1995,
2002; see also Poiani 2010, 392ff ). Second, I will not talk about heterosexual animal behav-
iours and mental states, if only because, as Bagemihl observes, “when it comes to heterosexual
activities, … scientists are not at all adverse to making analogies with human behaviours ….
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Male-female interactions in Savanna Baboons, for example, are likened to ‘May-December ro-
mances,’ ‘flirting,’ and other human courtship rituals in a ‘singles bar’” (Bagemihl 1999, 97–8).
Based on such observations, I expect mentalistic explanations of heterosexual behaviours in an-
imals to be less problematic than similar explanations of homosexual behaviours.
2 Explaining Away Animal Homosexuality: Two Case Studies
The American historian John Boswell once claimed that “by the time of the early Christian
fathers, almost all zoologists considered some animals homosexual” (1980, 52). But Boswell’s
claim needs some nuance. Most classical authors took the view that one might perhaps ascribe
homosexual behaviours to animals, but one certainly cannot explain these behaviours by associ-
ating them with homosexual mental states, like desires, preferences, or orientations. Plutarch,
for example, had a pig protagonist, Gryllus, claim that “to this very day the desires of beasts
have encompassed no homosexual mating” (Moralia, 900D). Homosexual behaviours are rare,
he claims, and they have nothing to do with love, lust, or desire, but rather with “necessity”
(Ibid., 991A) which, as I will illustrate, can mean many different things.
The bottom line of Gryllus’s lesson seems to be that, at least on an explanatory level, animal
homosexuality radically differs from human homosexuality. Implicitly or explicitly, the very
same lesson still lingers in modern research on animal homosexuality. In this section, I dis-
cuss two examples of such research: a nineteenth-century European debate about homosexual
copulation in beetles, particularly in cockchafers (Melolontha vulgaris), which I will refer to as
the Melolontha story, and a more recent case study on homosexual courtship in king penguins
(Apenodytes patagonicus).
The Melolontha story reveals a surprising variety of early expert opinions about many as-
pects of homosexual behaviour in animals (Brooks 2009). The story started in the 1830s, with
a number of written reports about homosexual copulation in cockchafers, published in various
specialist journals from that time. The first of these reports was an 1834 communication in the
German interdisciplinary science journal Isis von Oken, in which a German schoolteacher, Au-
gust Kelch, vividly described his disbelief (“he could barely believe his eyes”) upon discovering,
in a forest near Ratibor (currently Racibórz in Poland), a male common cockchafer covering
a smaller male forest cockchafer (Melolontha hippocastani) (Kelch 1834, 737). Kelch initially
believed the penetrated male to be a female with male antennae. (In cockchafers, males and fe-
males can be distinguished by male antennae being slightly bigger and longer.) He only changed
his mind when he found the penetrated male’s genitalia hidden in his abdomen. A later re-
port published by the French entomologist Alexandre Laboulbène (1859) confirmed Kelch’s
observations, while revealing more technical details about same-sex copulation in cockchafers.
From the outside, male-male couplings didn’t seem to differ much from male-female couplings
wherein males dangle backwards off the female’s back, seemingly asleep, while their penis and
anal stylet provide the sole point of attachment between both partners (Ibid., 569). In male-
male couplings, the penetrating male’s penis was inserted entirely into the external reproductive
orifice of the penetrated male. Consequently, the latter’s genitalia were pushed back into his
abdomen.
These first observations of insect same-sex copulation were greeted with a variety of nega-
tive attitudes, including disbelief and disgust. Nineteenth-century entomologists unanimously
concurred in morally condemning animal homosexual copulation, using such terms as ‘morbid’,
‘monstrous’, ‘unnatural’, and even ‘hideous’ (Brooks 2009). More importantly, their moral dis-
gust went hand in hand with a particular set of interpretations or explanations of the insects’
behaviour. For reasons to be explored, some commentators have described these explanations
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as “negative” (Bagmihl 1999, 88; Roughgarden 2009, 82). TheMelolontha story reveals at least
three negative explanations.
A first explanatory hypothesis, already popular in classical antiquity, says that animals only
court or mate with same-sex partners in the absence of available and suitable partners of the
opposite sex. This lack of choice, which is often associated with conditions of captivity, is one
of the possible meanings of ‘necessity’ in Gryllus’ account of animal homosexuality. In this view,
homosexuality is the outcome of a Hobson’s choice—a free choice in which only one option is
offered. In the Melolontha story, the Hobson’s choice hypothesis was defended by the French
physician and neurologist Charles Féré: “homosexual relationships among cockchafers do not
occur except in abnormal conditions. Thepursuit of anothermale only arises in the absence of females”
(Féré 1899, 85; italics mine).
A second hypothesis holds that animal homosexuality involves some kind of misidentifi-
cation or misunderstanding, particularly on the part of the penetrating partner. Some males
simply mistake other males for females—an error often precipitated by internal circumstances,
including uncontrollable lust on the part of the penetrating partner (another interpretation of
Gryllus’s ‘necessity’) and exhaustion on the part of the penetrated. One of the protagonists
in the Melolontha story, the German entomologist Doebner, suggested that male cockchafers
“make use of other males to satisfy their violent procreative urges, probably taking them for, and
overpowering them as, females in their blind passion” (Doebner 1850, 328; italics mine).
A third and final hypothesis, the dominance hypothesis, posits that animal homosexual be-
haviour is simply the outcome of the power struggle inherent in the social hierarchy of numerous
animal species. In this view, homosexual behaviours are all about power, rather than sex. They
help to negotiate power relations, particularly between males, but as a means of power, or so
the hypothesis goes, they actually have nothing to do with sex. According to Ford and Beach
(1951, 138), for example, Solly Zuckerman’s work on female-female mounting in baboons im-
plied that such behaviour “probably constitutes an expression of dominance rather than sexual
desire” (Italics mine).
During the twentieth century, negative attitudes towards animal homosexuality have mark-
edly abated, even though they continue to exist to this day, both in public opinion and among
scientists. However, negative explanations of animal homosexuality are still rife in the animal
sciences, if only in the tendency of some animal scientists to describe animal homosexual in-
teractions as “pseudo-copulations”, “mock courtships”, “sham matings”, or “false mountings”
(Bagemihl 1999, 96–7; see also Despret 2016). Recent research on male-male courtship be-
haviour in king penguins provides an excellent example of this continuing tradition of negative
explanations.
It has long been known that male penguins tend to be casual about sexual interaction. In
a recently-discovered pamphlet, originally written in 1911–12, the British antarctic explorer
George Levick already grudgingly reported cases of “adultery”, “necrophilia”, “sexual hooligan-
ism”, and homosexuality among male Adélie penguins (Levick 2012 [1915]). In one of the
notebook entries upon which the pamphlet was based, Levick sighed: “There seems to be no
crime too low for these Penguins” (quoted in Russell et al. 2012, 389). A later Antarctic expedi-
tion in the 1930s confirmed Levick’s observations, while at the same time adding an explanation.
Polar expert Brian Roberts hypothesised that penguins were “unaware of sex differences and do
not differentiate between males and females even in mating” (Roberts 1940, 213). Many pen-
guin species are sexually monomorphic, which means that males and females look very similar,
if not identical, at least to the human eye. For decades, most scientists simply assumed that
penguins themselves were also unable to recognize sex differences, and that mating misidentifi-
cations were the main cause of homosexual behaviours in this branch of the animal kingdom.
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This instantiation of the error hypothesis was disproved, however, in a recent study on male-
male courtship behaviours or ‘mating displays’ in a large colony of king penguins on Kerguelen
Island (Pincemy et al. 2010). Over 25 percent of displaying pairs in this colony consisted of two
males, courting each other on the leks during the breeding season by means of behaviours that
also occur in heterosexual displays. Standing close to each other, they stretch their bodies to a
maximum height, rotate their heads in unison, and expose various body parts. Why would they
do that? The researchers quickly ruled out the error hypothesis, as their findings indicated that
homosexual pairings occurred less often (and heterosexual ones more often) than one would
expect on the assumption that males (and females) were pairing randomly, unable to detect
their partners’ sex (Ibid., 1214). Perhaps a more cautious conclusion would have been to say
that, even though this particular penguin species generally does seem to be able to correctly
identify the partners’ sex, mistakes may still occur.
To explain these birds’ behaviour, however, the researchers finally gravitated towards a vari-
ant of the Hobson’s choice hypothesis, indicating that even though their sample of displaying
birds consisted of both males and females, it still had a sex ratio of 62 percent males. Therefore,
some males on the lek didn’t have access to females. For those who wonder why these males
didn’t simply walk away, hoping they would be luckier next time, the researchers provided an
extra explanation, referring to earlier research which indicated that “when king penguins came
back from the sea, males had high concentrations of testosterone and luteinizing hormone, ren-
dering individuals extremely motivated to display, perhaps to any adult king penguin” (Ibid., 1214;
italics mine). Once on the lek, and due to these hormones, males cannot but start courting
whoever they meet.
These two case studies illustrate how animal scientists typically prefer hypotheses in which
homosexual activities are explained as the effect of inabilities (in sex recognition), unusual cir-
cumstances (sex ratio) and overwhelming biological imperatives (sex hormones). Critics con-
sider these hypotheses as negative explanations to the extent that they seem to “explain away”
animal homosexuality (Bagmihl 1999, 88; Roughgarden 2009, 82). In philosophy, explaining
away a phenomenon X usually means showing that X does not exist, or at least that it is no
longer rational to believe that X exists (Ratzsch and Koperski 2015). One can do so by appeal-
ing to the explanatory power of alternative hypotheses in which X doesn’t play any role, much
like caloric was explained away by the mechanical theory of heat. In this context, ‘X ’ stands
for animal homosexuality, and so the claim that some hypotheses, such as the Hobson’s choice
hypothesis or the error hypothesis, explain away animal homosexuality, can be taken to mean
that they indicate that such a phenomenon does not exist.
But do they, really? At first sight, many scientific studies on animal homosexuality aren’t
so dismissive. The penguin report, for example, speaks of homosexual mating displays, and
even of “occurrences of homosexual pairs in penguins” (Pincemy et al. 2010, 1211; italics mine).
However, by providing mechanistic explanations for such behaviours in terms of sex ratios and
hormone levels (think of Gryllus’s ‘necessity’), these studies generally avoid mentalistic explana-
tions, i.e., explanations in terms of certain mental states underlying such behaviours. In humans,
homosexual behaviours are usually seen as indicating an underlying homosexual desire, prefer-
ence, orientation, or identity. So what is being explained away by mechanistic hypotheses is
the existence of animal homosexual behaviour qua expression of underlying mental states, as
well as the existence of homosexual mental states as such (which may or may not be expressed
in behaviour). It is important to mention, however, that the negative explanations discussed
here may well help us to make sense of some homosexual activities in the animal world. But
commentators worry about the ubiquity and casualness with which they are (and have been)
used to explain such activities (Bagemihl 1999; Roughgarden 2009).
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Assuming that some scientific hypotheses about animal homosexuality do indeed (attempt
to) explain away some part of the phenomenon, one may ask whether they succeed in doing so.
This question is much harder to answer because there are many philosophical issues lurking in
the background. The analogy with the philosophical debate about teleology is very instructive.
Some Darwinians claim that Darwin’s theory of evolution explains away the existence of design
in the living world, but their opponents deny this by pointing to various philosophical issues
related to the concept of design. Ratzsch and Koperski’s (2015) conclusive analysis of this
debate is also relevant for the debate about animal homosexuality: “Disagreement over deeper
philosophical or other principles will frequently generate divergence over when something has
or has not been explained away.” In the following sections, I discuss two philosophical issues
underlying and nurturing negative explanations of animal homosexuality: the problem of other
minds and the many-headed problem of anthropomorphism.
3 Minding Animals
Is it justified to ascribe homosexual behaviours or mental states to nonhuman animals? The
Melolontha story and many contemporary case studies on animal homosexuality illustrate how
difficult it is for animal scientists to even entertain the possibility that animal behaviour would be
guided by mental states like sexual desires or preferences. In their view, male cockchafers do not
want to have sex with another male—they are forced into it by some combination of inabilities,
unusual circumstances, and biological imperatives. Similarly, and again according to animal
scientists, same-sex courtship displays in male penguins don’t actually tell us anything about the
actors’ desires or preferences—they simply reveal the inevitability of mating misidentifications
in sexually monomorphic animal species, or the necessity of natural processes.
These and other explanations of animal homosexuality can be interpreted to reveal the con-
tinuing popularity of a mechanical view of nonhuman animals, in which they are portrayed as
complex but mindless biological machines (Despret 2016). In its turn, this view arises, at least
in part, from a philosophical problem known as the problem of other minds. This problem is an
epistemological one and is traditionally discussed in the context of human minds: How do we
know whether other human beings have minds? Homosexual desires and preferences are men-
tal states, which means they are part of what we call a mind. Philosophers distinguish between
various kinds of mental state (see, e.g., Rowlands 2009). Propositional attitudes are attitudes
one adopts vis-à-vis a propositional content. Being directed towards this content, they have
what is known in philosophy as intentionality or aboutness. One cannot, for example, simply
desire—one always desires someone or something. The same goes for various other cognitive,
conative, and affective mental states, such as preference, memory, belief, hope, and fear. Sen-
sations are a second kind of mental state. Bodily feelings, like pain or pleasure, don’t have the
typical intentionality of propositional attitudes, and unlike propositional attitudes, they have a
distinct phenomenology. One can ask what it is like to have a particular sensation. A similar
question can be asked about a third kind of mental state, i.e., experiences, which includes per-
ceptual states, such as seeing, hearing, and touching. Like propositional attitudes, and unlike
sensations, experiences are about something; unlike propositional attitudes, and like sensations,
they have a distinct phenomenology. In any case, when we talk about a mind, we usually refer
to a set of states belonging to one or more of these three categories or kinds of mental state.
The problem of other minds arises from a distinct asymmetry in accessing my own mental
states versus other people’s mental states. I have a privileged and direct access to my own mental
states, so I can’t be wrong, for example, when I claim to experience pain. The mental life of
fellow humans, however, is only indirectly accessible for me. With varying success, I attempt
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to infer what other people experience, think or feel, from what they do or say, including their
body language. The inevitability of this detour introduces the possibility of error in ascribing
mental states to fellow humans. In fact it prevents me from knowing with certainty whether
other people have any mental states at all. For all we know, they might be inventively designed
mindless machines, and that hypothesis applies a fortiori to nonhuman animals. Language is
an extremely important, though occasionally rather wobbly, carrier of information about other
people’s minds, so the problem of other minds only gets worse in the context of the animal
sciences. How are we to know, with any certainty, whether, and to what extent, nonhuman
animals are capable of having mental states?
Still, there are solutions to the problem of other minds, whether they are human or nonhu-
man (for an overview, see Andrews 2015 and Allen and Bekoff 1997). One of these solutions
is an argument from analogy. The argument takes the form of an analogical inference. I know
that my own mental states are intimately connected with various behaviours and bodily states.
My sexual desire, for example, usually shows itself in various bodily signs of sexual arousal, but
also in my tendency to act in ways that are likely to bring about the object of my desire. There-
fore, on observing the same or similar behaviours and bodily states in other living beings, I am
entitled to infer that they also have similar mental states. The category of bodily states should
be interpreted broadly so as to include brain states, physiological facts, and DNA. The more
similarities involved, the more likely that other creatures have minds like mine. This likelihood
is of course inversely proportional to the phylogenetic distance between their species and mine.
The argument from analogy is often complemented with a so-called inference to the best
explanation, which is in fact a general rule of thumb for reasoning: given two or more com-
peting hypotheses for X , infer the truth of that hypothesis which best explains X . Consider
the case of king penguin courtship again. One hypothesis explains such sexual behaviour as the
mechanical effect of various internal and external circumstances. But why not consider still an-
other hypothesis, i.e., that some male king penguins actually desire or even prefer to court other
males? Elevated levels of sex hormones may indicate that they are indeed sexually aroused when
courting other males, and research shows that they go to great lengths to be close to each other,
with a tiny minority of them even learning each other’s trumpeting calls (Pincemy et al. 2010).
In human males, such bodily states and behaviours usually reflect a mental state, such as a ho-
mosexual desire, and so it is perfectly legitimate to hypothesize that some male-male penguin
courtship displays are driven by relevantly similar mental states. Whether such displays are best
explained in terms of these states, is at least in part an empirical matter, as it depends on a com-
parison of the predictive and explanatory powers of both hypotheses. My question is why some
animal scientists systemically fail to even consider mentalistic hypotheses for animal homosexual
behaviours.
Critics may object that both the argument from analogy and the inference to the best ex-
planation argument have their weaknesses, and that we may never be justified to the point of
certainty when ascribing mental states to non-human animals. The point is, however, that these
arguments are generally considered sufficient for ascribing mental states to humans, so the onus
is on the animal minds skeptic to explain why they can’t or don’t work in the context of animal
minds.
4 Humanising Animals
The problem of other minds is an epistemological one: how do we know whether other living
beings are minded (like us)? For those who don’t mind minding animals, another problem
promptly pops up: the problem of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism implies a (facile)
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projection of human characteristics onto nonhuman animals. This projection is based on the
assumption that both species are relevantly similar, at least in certain respects, and it often
serves to confirm that similarity. The problem with anthropomorphism is that, by projecting
our minds and mental states onto nonhuman animals, we thereby ignore the individuality of
their own minds and mental states.
The anthropomorphism objection can be interpreted in at least two different ways (Fisher
1996). In the next two sections, I will associate two kinds of anthropomorphism with two com-
mon objections against animal homosexuality, both of which are in fact attempts at explaining it
away. In this section I associate categorical anthropomorphism with the claim that nonhuman
animals don’t belong to the logical category of beings capable of having certain homosexual
mental states. This objection leads us to consider the nature of four such states (desires, prefer-
ences, orientations, and identities), as well as the question why nonhuman animals would not
be able to have them. In the next section, I connect situational anthropomorphism with the
objection that at least some animal homosexual behaviours and mental states should not be la-
beled as homosexual because they aren’t sexual in the first place. This objection will bring us to
a metaphysical discussion about the nature of sexuality.
Categorical anthropomorphism implies that ascribing human characteristics to nonhuman
animals amounts to a logical mistake, i.e., a category mistake. A category mistake is a fallacy
in which something of a specific type or logical category is considered to belong to a different
type or logical category. Following Gilbert Ryle’s famous example, a tourist commits such a fal-
lacy when, after a guided tour of the many university buildings in Oxford, he asks to be shown
the university itself (Ryle 1949). The mistake follows from the assumption that a university
belongs to the logical category of buildings, while it actually belongs to the logical category of
organisations or institutions. Similarly, it would be misguided to ascribe homosexual desires,
preferences, orientations, or identities to cockchafers or king penguins, because they don’t be-
long to the logical category of beings capable of having such mental states.
In the previous section I noted that the likelihood of nonhuman animals having minds like
ours is inversely proportional to the phylogenetic distance between us. Therefore it is indeed
implausible to attribute highly complex mental states to nonhuman animals that, from a phylo-
genetic point of view, are far removed from the human species, like birds, reptiles, and insects.
It doesn’t seem plausible, for example, to say that common cockchafers know that we know that
they belong to the family of Scarabaeidae. In philosophical parlance, such highly complex men-
tal states are known as second-order beliefs. But what about desires, preferences, orientations,
and identities? Let us consider each of them in turn.
Desires
Some philosophers have argued that cockchafer or king penguin desires (if they have any) cannot
be all that similar to human sexual desires simply because they lack the cognitive machinery that
humans require to produce such complex mental states. Edward Stein, for example, employs
this argument to criticise the use of fruit flies as models for human homosexuality, but his
argument applies to cockchafer and penguin desires as well. He notes: “Fruit flies cannot be
said to have desires or to experience attraction in ways even remotely like how humans have
desires and experience attraction. (…). Human sexual responses are cognitively mediated, by
which I mean that human sexual desire is intimately intertwined with our thinking processes.
Flies do not have the relevant thought processes; in fact, they are at best borderline cognitive
systems” (Stein 1999, 166–7). In Stein’s view, it is very likely that birds do not have sexual
desires either: “Although birds certainly have greater cognitive capacities than flies, it is not
 OPEN ACCESS - PTPBIO.ORG
ADRIAENS: IN DEFENCE OF ANIMAL HOMOSEXUALITY 9
clear whether seagulls have the cognitive architecture required for desires and intentions; after
all, the expression ‘bird brain’ means ‘stupid’ for a reason” (Stein 1999, 170–171).
One of the problems with Stein’s argumentation is that his conceptualisation of desire is
overly restrictive. Like many other common concepts, including the concepts of sexuality,
mind, and knowledge (Silverman 2000), the concept of desire originates in a body of knowl-
edge philosophers and psychologists refer to as folk psychology—a mishmash of lay constructs
and conceptions, all of which have been endlessly adapted and rearranged throughout history
in order to meet the changing demands of their users. Therefore, it should not surprise us that
‘desire’ has evolved to refer to a whole range of phenomena, and that there is quite a bit of dis-
agreement among philosophers about how exactly to define the concept. Some of them would
perhaps side with Stein in saying that desires are “intimately intertwined with our thinking
processes” (Stein 1999, 167). Good-based theories of desire, for example, hold that a desire is
to be equated with the belief that the object of the desire is good (see, e.g., Schroeder 2015). If
such theories hold weight, then animals cannot have desires unless they can have beliefs—just
another topic on which philosophers tend to disagree (Davidson 1982; Rowlands 2009).
Other philosophers disagree with this characterisation of desires as highly complex mental
states. Some of them have focused on subjective arousal and feelings of pleasure that tend to
accompany the satisfaction of a desire (Strawson 1994). Still others focus on the distinctive
motivational value of desires, arguing that having a desire basically means being disposed to act
in ways that are likely to bring about the object of desire (Smith 1994). In this view, desires are
basically dispositions to act in a particular way. In the context of sexuality, some animal scientists
have already operationalised such dispositions by measuring the lengths to which an animal will
go to obtain sexual contact with a potential mate that is at a physical distance and only available
via visual auditory or olfactory stimuli (Pfaus 2003). Many studies have shown, for example,
that male rats are willing to sustain multiple electric shocks to have sex with a conspecific that
they perceive to be in the typical mating posture (Pfaff 1999; Pfaus et al. 2012). If these studies
are sound, it seems fair to conclude that the animals involved possess motivational structures
that are highly similar to human sexual desires, and that therefore ascribing sexual desires to
nonhuman animals is not a category mistake.
Of course Stein is right in saying that (some) human sexual desires are cognitively mediated,
but so are many other human behaviours and mental states. Human experiences and emotions,
for example, are intimately connected with various thinking processes, but that does not prevent
us from ascribing hunger and anxiety to at least some nonhuman animals. In doing so, we do
not have to assume that human hunger is identical to hunger in nonhuman animals, only that
both phenomena are similar enough. Likewise, speaking of homosexual desires in cockchafers
and king penguins does not automatically entail equating them with human homosexual desires.
At this point, anti-anthropomorphists would perhaps concede that some definitions of de-
sire allow us to continue talking about homosexual desires in at least some nonhuman animal
species. At the same time, they would insist on reserving the term ‘homosexuality’ for human
behaviours and mental states, because at least some of these behaviours and mental states can-
not be found elsewhere in the animal kingdom. So the argument seems to be that perhaps male
cockchafers and king penguins are capable of sexually desiring one another, but even then their
behaviours and desires should not be described as homosexual, for some other mental state X is
the only true kind of homosexuality, and X , unlike behaviours or desires, can only be found in
the human species.
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Preferences
To understand this argument, we need to go back to the variety of characteristics associated
with human homosexuality: behaviours, desires, preferences, orientations, and identities. In
the previous section I discussed the relationship between behaviours and desires, and earlier in
this section I defined desire as a disposition to act. Now a sexual desire per se does not always
provide evidence of a sexual preference. According to the Hobson’s choice hypothesis, some
males only court or mount each other in the absence of suitable females. Their sexual behaviour
may well be motivated by a homosexual desire, but that doesn’t mean they sexually prefer males
over females. Primatologist Paul Vasey (2002) proposes to speak of homosexual preferences only
in contexts where a male prefers to have sex with another male, rather than a suitable female, or
where a female prefers to have sex with another female, rather than a suitable male. In his view,
a preference always entails some kind of choice, and the choice involved needs to be more than
just a Hobson’s choice. Both options have to be equivalent, viz equally likely to result in sexual
contact. Vasey provides a list of five criteria for determining whether a given animal exhibits
a homosexual preference rather than simply a homosexual desire: “First, the subject should be
able to simultaneously choose between a male or female. Second, the two stimulus animals should
ideally be sexually proceptive vis-à-vis the subject. Third, these interactions must culminate in
actual sexual behavior between the subject and the same-sex stimulus animal. Fourth, the subject
must be uncoerced. Fifth, it must be demonstrated that the behaviors used to measure sexual partner
preference are sexual, at least in part” (Vasey 2002, 147; italics in original).
Research onmale-male tandem formation in the common bluetail (Ischnura elegans)—a dam-
selfly species—suggests there are indeed such things as homosexual preferences, in Vasey’s sense,
in the nonhuman animal kingdom. Tandem formation is a typical courtship behaviour in vari-
ous damselfly species. It consists of one individual clasping another at the prothorax—the front
segment of the trunk—with its abdominal appendages. The clasped individual decides whether
or not copulation ensues after the tandem is formed—a decision most likely based on some
kind of assessment of the relevant characteristics of the grasping individual. Similar to same-sex
courtship in king penguins and same-sex mounting in cockchafers, male-male tandem forma-
tion in damselflies appears to be rather common in wildlife populations where both males and
females are abundantly available (Utzeri and Belfiore 1990). Recent experimental evidence has
confirmed these earlier wildlife observations (Van Gossum et al. 2005). Nearly 20% of freshly
caught male common bluetails preferred to form a tandem with another male in a binary choice
experiment wherein each (focal) male individual was given the choice between a male and a
female. To their surprise, scientists also found that nearly 75% of males displayed a homosex-
ual preference after they had spent a few days in an all-male insectary. The numbers declined
again after the same males were immersed in an all-female population. (Ibid.) To rule out sex
recognition issues, the scientists actually organised two parallel binary-choice experiments: one
in which males had to choose between a male and an andromorph female, i.e., a female resem-
bling male conspecifics in body colouration, and another in which they had to choose between a
male and a gynomorph female, i.e., a female with a distinctively female colouration. The results
were highly similar: in the experiment with gynomorph females, approximately 20% of males
also displayed a homosexual preference (Ibid.).
While attesting to the existence of homosexual preferences in nonhuman animals, the Is-
chnura-story also reveals an important limitation in Vasey’s analysis of the concept of homosex-
ual preference. In my view, his list of criteria lacks an element of continuity or stability. A strict
interpretation would allow us to conclude that a single sexual choice reveals a sexual preference.
Intuitively, however, it seems that ascertaining a sexual preference involves more than a simple
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snapshot; it also involves a given choice to be repeated over time in consecutive sexual interac-
tions, preferably in different social and physical environments, where bothmales and females are
simultaneously available. This critique also applies to the damselfly-experiments and the king
penguin study discussed above, in which the researchers failed to monitor the stability of sexual
choices throughout consecutive experiments. It would indeed be interesting to know whether
those males who preferentially courted other males would also display a homosexual preference
in later experiments or observations.
Orientations
A solution to the problem with Vasey’s definition of preference would be to distinguish be-
tween a homosexual preference and a homosexual orientation, reserving the term ‘preference’
for transient or even single sexual choices and the term ‘orientation’ for continuous or perma-
nent homosexual preferences which, by definition, tend to exclude heterosexual activities. The
twin elements of stability and exclusivity make it very hard for wildlife biologists to ascertain a
homosexual orientation in nonhuman animals. After all, it is virtually impossible to determine
whether an animal in the wild has never had any heterosexual contact, desire or preference, let
alone whether it will never have one. It shouldn’t surprise us, then, that some scientists consider
homosexual orientations to be “very uncommon” in nonhuman animals (see, e.g., LeVay 1996,
270).
But still they exist, and in various classes across the animal kingdom. Male bottlenose dol-
phins (Tursiops truncatus) are perhaps the best-known mammalian example. On this species
Bagemihl notes: “The majority of males in some populations form lifelong homosexual pairs,
specific examples of which have been verified as lasting for more than ten years and continuing
until death” (Bagemihl 1999, 48). In other animal classes, life-long companionships that involve
sexual behaviours such as mounting or courtship, have been documented more extensively. The
literature abounds with observations of such companionships in bird species including roseate
terns (Sterna dougallii) (Nisbet and Hatch 1999), and laysan albatrosses (Phoebastri immutabilis)
(Young et al. 2008). Importantly, none of these cases is associated with sex-segregation. They all
involve animals who have access, either continually or occasionally, to members of the opposite
sex.
Identities
One last stronghold of anti-anthropomorphism in the context of animal homosexuality is the
concept of homosexual identity. While this concept plays an important part in numerous psy-
chological, historical and sexological studies about human homosexuality, it has always been
alarmingly underdefined, as Cass already noted in the 1980s: “There are literally hundreds of
scientific articles that refer to homosexual identity, without explaining what is meant by the
concept” (Cass 1984, 107). It is quite telling, for example, that a prestigious handbook such
as The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (Abelove et al. 1993), contains plenty of essays dealing
with sexual identities and identity politics, while none of these essays actually explains what the
concept of identity is supposed to mean.
In the psychological literature, the term ‘identity’ is often used to refer to people who simply
answer ‘gay’ or ‘homosexual’ to the question of what their sexual orientation or preference is.
For these individuals, identifying as homosexual is one way of answering the question ‘Who am
I?’ (Howard 2000). Elsewhere, for example in the sociological or political literature, the term
refers to a set of properties that are somehow associated with homosexuality, to the extent that
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they are considered to be characteristic of someone with a homosexual preference or a homosex-
ual orientation. In both of these ‘definitions’, a homosexual identity seems to presuppose the
capacity for self-consciousness—the capacity to be aware of oneself as oneself. This condition
would seem to prevent most animal species from developing some characteristic even vaguely
similar to a homosexual identity in humans. Even though some animal scientists claim to have
found indications of self-consciousness in certain primate species such as gorillas, orang-utans
and chimpanzees, but also in bottlenose dolphins, killer whales, elephants (Plotnik et al. 2006),
and magpies (Prior et al. 2008), all of which appear to recognise themselves in their reflection
in a mirror, none of them would go as far as to infer that some animals identify with their sexual
orientation. It seems fair to say that the presence of both homosexuality and self-consciousness
is probably a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient, condition for an organism to exhibit a
homosexual identity, as it testified in the sexual history of many human cultural groups.
Occasionally, however, identity talk causes confusion in the debate about animal homosex-
uality. According to Jennifer Terry, for example, one particular study of homosexuality in fruit
flies (Odenwald and Zhang 1995) was based on the assumption that ‘mutant flies’ can be clas-
sified “in terms of identity—that is, as gay fruit flies rather than simply as flies that exhibited
homosexual behaviour” (Terry 2000, 167). Terry’s interpretation was not very charitable, how-
ever, and was largely based on a misinterpretation of the authors’ use of the term ‘gay’. Oden-
wald and Zhang didn’t use that word to suggest that fruit flies self-identify in terms of their
sexual behaviours, desires or preferences. They simply, though perhaps unwisely, considered it
a synonym for ‘homosexual’.
In sum, one can only continue to use the anthropomorphism objection against animal ho-
mosexuality by equating ‘homosexuality’ with ‘homosexual identity’, and while there are no ob-
jections of principle in doing so, it does go against the practice, both in the animal sciences
and outside, of labeling at least some animal activities as homosexual activities. Of course anti-
anthropomorphists could argue that this practice is misguided, and that our vocabulary should
be expanded to include neologisms specifically designed to refer to what is now known as animal
homosexuality, such as ‘unisexuality’ (Gowaty 1982, 631), ‘same-sex sexuality’ (Bailey and Zuk
2009), ‘ambisexuality’ or ‘isosexuality’ (for a list of such terms, see Bagemihl 1999, 97), all of
which are supposed to be more “descriptive, adaptable, operational, and unemotional” (Gowaty
1982, 631).
To be sure, these proposals have advantages. First of all, they could help scientific research
to refocus on the individuality and singularity of the sex life of nonhuman animals, rather than
on its (dis)similarities with human sex life. The American biologist Marlene Zuk uses this argu-
ment in a recent essay on penguin sex. The gay movement often refers to the many male homo-
sexual penguin couples in zoos as evidence for the normality of human homosexual parenting,
while conservatives pay tribute to the dedication of heterosexual penguin-males in protecting
their nest and their offspring. These ideological debates, Zuk argues, divert our attention from
what is potentially unique in the secret sex life of penguin species: “If we use animals as poster
children for ideology, … we risk losing sight of what is truly interesting and important about
their behaviour” (Zuk 2006, 917). A second advantage of alternative designations for ‘animal ho-
mosexuality’, is that they aren’t tainted with the biases and the sensationalism that still surround
human homosexuality. For example, Gowaty mentions a scientific paper entitled ‘Homosexual
rape in acantocephalan worms’. In her view, the paper was greeted with “a lurid snicker” and
subsequently cast aside because of its perceived thirst for sensation, which the audience “felt
represented a tactic akin to a Madison Avenue sales pitch” (Gowaty 1982, 631). Either way,
she concluded, the paper wasn’t read seriously.
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Themain advantage of alternative terms—their neutrality—also entails a disadvantage: they
have very little or no meaning in colloquial language. While perhaps promoting neutral commu-
nication among scientists, they also hamper science popularisation. In translating their findings
to a lay audience, scientists will ultimately have to appeal to the usual suspects, such as ‘homo-
sexuality’. Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, ‘unisexuality’ and other such terms make
it much harder to detect important similarities between (some kinds of ) animal homosexuality
and (some kinds of ) human homosexuality, thus increasing the risk of missing out important
information when studying both phenomena in comparative analyses. As the Australian bi-
ologist Aldo Poiani puts it: continuing to use the term ‘homosexuality’ in the animal sciences
“allows us to put all species on equal terms from amethodological perspective, and study them in
comparative analyses that will detect differences and similarities in the association of same-sex
mounting with various other variables and contexts” (Poiani 2010, 35).
It would indeed be regrettable to have our terminology, rather than our best empirical ev-
idence, decide whether or not there are any similarities between human and non-human ho-
mosexuality. I therefore propose to continue using the term ‘animal homosexuality’, on the
understanding that it simply refers to any kind of sexual contact between two individuals or
organisms of the same sex. Unfortunately, even this basic definition brings its own problems,
as I will explain in the next section.
5 Desexualising Animals
Even if one accepts that animals are minded creatures, and that they are capable of having
mental states that are relevantly similar to those we appeal to in explaining human homosexual
behaviours, one could still argue that ascribing homosexuality to nonhuman animals can be a
mistake—a factual mistake rather than a categorical one. Talking about animal homosexuality,
or so the objection goes, we see homosexual behaviours and mental states where there are in fact
none, because they aren’t sexual in the first place.
This argument appeals to a second kind of anthropomorphism, situational anthropomor-
phism, in which we erroneously ascribe a behaviour or mental state to a nonhuman animal that
may well be capable of such states, but doesn’t, at this moment, find itself in any of them (Fisher
1996). Typical examples of situational anthropomorphism include the grinning of chimpansees,
which humans often read as an expression of joy, while it actually is an anxious reaction to an
unexpected and frightening stimulus. Chimpansees may well be able to experience joy; they
simply don’t express it by means of grinning. Similarly, cockchafers and king penguins may
well be capable of having homosexual desires and preferences, but mounting and courting are
not to be considered manifestations of such mental states. Following the three negative explana-
tions discussed in the first section of my paper, these behaviours may be interpreted alternatively
as the result of a Hobson’s choice, a sexual identification error, or some kind of power game.
While all three of these explanations can be interpreted as attempts to explain away animal
homosexuality, the third one does so in a very particular way. The power game explanation can
indeed be taken to imply that ascribing homosexual behaviours and mental states to nonhuman
animals is a case of situational anthropomorphism, because it erroneously assumes that such
behaviours and mental states are sexual in the first place. To understand this objection, one
must connect the power game explanation with the literature on dominance hierarchy. A domi-
nance hierarchy is basically a social ranking system that determines one’s access to resources and
mates (Wickler 1967; Vasey 1995). In the animal sciences, homosexual behaviours are often
thought of as ritualised gestures for communicating and further establishing one’s rank within
the hierarchy (see, e.g., Sommer and Vasey 2006; Adriaens and De Block 2016). The roles that
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individuals adopt during such interactions reflect their position in the ranking system: penetrat-
ing or mounting expresses one’s dominance over the other, while being penetrated or mounted
expresses one’s subordination.
Critics argue that the dominance hypothesis, like many other functional explanations of ani-
mal homosexual behaviour, is guilty of “desexualising same-sex sexuality” (Bagemihl 1999, 687;
Sommer et al. 2006, 265). According to Bagemihl, for example, the logic of such explanations
dictates that homosexual behaviour is either functional or sexual behaviour. So if it is functional,
it can’t be sexual; and if it can’t be sexual, it obviously can’t be homosexual either. A recent case
study illustrates the continuing allure of such reasoning. In August 2017, the British wildlife
photographer and conservationist Paul Goldstein caught two male lions on camera “sneaking
off into the bushes … for some privacy”, somewhere in a far corner of the Masai Mara nature
reserve in Kenya (Malm 2017). His pictures document how one lion mounts the other in a
copulation that takes approximately a minute—much longer than the average heterosexual lion
copulation. After that, the couple hung around for a while, cuddling and nuzzling each other,
and even, as Goldstein put it in aDailyMail interview, “throwing a conspiratorial wink” (Ibid.).
Goldstein didn’t mind interpreting the lions’ behaviour as homosexual, but some scientific com-
mentators, like Craig Packer from the Lion Center in Minnesota, were quick to dismiss his
interpretation as an example of situational anthropomorphism. In an interview with the science
website Live Science, Packer claims that “the mounting behaviour isn’t actually sexual” (quoted
in Pappas 2017). Rather, he says, “it’s a social interaction that has nothing to do with sexual
pleasure.” What Packer seems to be doing here is to explain away homosexual behaviour as
social behaviour, rather than (homo)sexual behaviour. In the history of research on the topic,
explaining away animal homosexuality by desexualising it has not been uncommon. I already
mentioned the work of Zuckerman, but the practice extends further back in time. At the end
of the nineteenth century, for example, the German sexologist Albert Moll criticised earlier
observations of female homosexual mounting in monkeys and dogs by asking whether “perhaps
they were just playing”, and then concluding that “we can’t just consider such little games as
homosexual acts” (Moll 1898, 369).
The term ‘socio-sexual’ often pops up in this context, and the true meaning of this term,
according to Bagemihl (1999, 116), is “not fully or exclusively sexual.” Concluding a section on
functional explanations of animal homosexuality, he posits: “In the vast majority of cases these
functions are ascribed to a behaviour instead of, rather than along with, a sexual component
…. The erasure by zoologists of sexual interpretations from same-sex contexts has been cate-
gorical and nearly ubiquitous” (Bagemihl 1999, 115–6). On this subject, however, I disagree
with Bagemihl. For one thing, many zoologists and evolutionary biologists are well aware of
the possibility that homosexual behaviour can serve one or more evolutionary functions, such
as dominance expression or alliance formation, without thereby losing its sexual character. Ho-
mosexuality, whether human or animal, can be both functional and sexual (Sommer and Vasey
2006, 13; see also Poiani 2010).
Another problem with Bagemihl’s wholesale critique is its disregard for the possibility that
(some) scientists don’t consider (some) homosexual behaviours in animals sexual simply because
these behaviours fall outside their implicit or explicit definition of sexuality. Here the debate
about explaining away animal homosexuality leads us to explore a rathermetaphysical issue—the
nature of sexuality. Suppose we would define ‘sexual behaviour’ rather narrowly as ‘behaviour
involving genital penetration and including ejaculation’. In that case we would have good rea-
sons to not classify kissing, genital nuzzling or beak-genital propulsion as sexual behaviours.
(Beak-genital propulsion is a behaviour typical of some species of waterfowl in which one an-
imal inserts its bill into the anal opening of the other, thus propelling it through the water.)
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Therefore, in order to evaluate Packer’s claim that same-sex mounting in lions is ‘not really sex-
ual’, we first need to understand how he defines ‘sexuality’, and how the larger community of
animal scientists has come to understand it.
What is the nature of sexuality? The question is answered differently in two authoritative
and recent definitions of ‘homosexual behaviour’ in the animal science literature. In a review
paper, Bailey and Zuk (2009, 441) define ‘homosexual behaviour’ as “interactions between same-
sex individuals that also occur between opposite-sex individuals in the context of reproduction.”
The underlying assumption seems to be that homosexual interactions derive their sexual quality
from also occuring in the context of reproduction. Both mounting in cockchafers and courtship
displays in king penguins are part of the respective species’ reproductive behavioural repertoire,
so according to Bailey and Zuk they are to be considered sexual and, more particularly, homo-
sexual. However, the case of the Kenyan lions isn’t so clear-cut. Does the mounting involved
also occur in reproductive interactions? On the one hand, there are remarkable similarities be-
tween homosexual and heterosexual mounting in lions, such as the main movements and the
sexual position. On the other, there are also striking differences. As noted above, homosexual
mounting can take longer than the heterosexual variant. It is also less violent—the penetrating
partner doesn’t run off immediately after ejaculating. Some commentators, including Packer,
even claim that there is in fact no ejaculation involved in homosexual mounting.
The question is, then, whether these differences are big enough to conclude that the mount-
ing involved in same-sex interactions doesn’t occur in the context of reproduction. If Packer
thinks they are, then he can legitimately conclude that homosexual mounting is ‘not really sex-
ual’. Bagemihl would be wrong to dismiss such conclusion as morally or politically motivated
(see also Poiani 2010, 11), though he rightly criticises the fact that some biologists seem to use
two different definitions of sexuality at the same time: a broad one in discussions of hetero-
sexual behaviour, and a very narrow one in discussions of homosexual behaviour. He provides
an interesting example: “Simple genital nuzzling of a female Vicuna by a male—taking place
outside of the breeding season, and without any mounting or copulation to accompany it—is
classified as sexual behaviour, while actual same-sex mounting in the same species is considered
nonsexual or ‘play’ behaviour” (Bagemihl 1999, 117).
In philosophy, a definition is considered vague to the extent that it allows for borderline
cases to occur. Bailey and Zuk’s definition of ‘homosexual behaviour’ is vague because it can-
not settle whether homosexual mounting in lions is to be considered homosexual behaviour or
not. Apart from being vague, this first definition is also needlessly restrictive, in that it requires
a homosexual behaviour to also occur “between opposite-sex individuals in the context of repro-
duction” (Ibid.; italics mine). It seems obvious, however, that there are numerous examples of
non-reproductive heterosexual behaviours, including fellatio and masturbation, that also have
a counterpart in male-male interactions. Should we then conclude that (same-sex) fellatio and
masturbation cannot be considered homosexual behaviours?
Perhaps a second definition of ‘homosexual behaviour’ can bring some relief. Bagemihl
avoids the restrictiveness of the first definition by defining ‘homosexuality’ as “any activity be-
tween two animals of the same sex that involves behaviors independently recognized (usually in
heterosexual contexts) as courtship, sexual, pair-bonding, or parenting activities” (Bagemihl 1999,
98–9; italics mine). Further down the same page, he indeed proposes a “ ‘broad’ definition of
homosexuality” as referring “not only to overt sexual behavior between animals of the same sex,
but also to related activities that are more typically associated with a heterosexual or breeding
context.” By creating a new benchmark—heterosexuality rather than reproduction—to adju-
dicate on borderline cases, Bagemihl’s definition indeed allows us to include same-sex fellatio
and masturbation as instances of homosexual behaviour. Much like Bailey and Zuk’s defini-
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tion, however, it cannot help us determine whether male-male mounting in lions belongs to the
same category, unless Bagemihl were to specify what he means by “overt sexual behaviour” and
“independently recognizing” a behaviour as a sexual one.
It seems fair to say, then, that these two definitions of ‘homosexual behaviour’ in nonhuman
animals cannot help us answer the question what conditions a behaviour or mental state has to
fulfil in order to be sexual. But perhaps the question itself is misguided in assuming that all
and only sexual behaviours and mental states share some unique common denominator which
explains their sexual quality. This assumption is considered dubious in the scant philosophical
literature on the nature of sexuality (Soble 2008; Christina 2017). Perhaps it would be wiser to
conceptualise sexuality as a family, i.e., a casual conglomeration of elements that lack a single
common denominator, but share a multitude of family resemblances. The concept of family is
very broadly defined here, referring to a set of related individuals endlessly extending both in
time and in kinship, thus including great-great-grandparents and other distant relatives. Each
family has its own prototypes—individuals typified by a high number of family resemblances—
as well as its borderline cases, growing in number upon following the family tree up or down
in time or kinship. To characterize a family, one doesn’t look for its essence, but rather for its
prototypes and family resemblances. Borderline cases are unavoidable, so a family is a very vague
entity indeed. Such an account of sexuality could be labeled a Wittgensteinian or prototype-
resemblance account.
A prototype resemblance analysis of the concept of sexuality relieves us of the obligation to
come upwith a clear-cut answer to each and every question about the sexual nature of behaviours
andmental states. Mounting, courting, penetrating, kissing, nuzzling, throwing a conspiratorial
wink—they may not share some unique common denominator, but they do share many family
resemblances. Some sexual behaviours involve erection or ejaculation or vaginal lubrication;
some are pleasurable; some occur in the context of reproduction; some are closely tied up with
specific mental states, such as sexual desires; and so on. Behaviours typified by many such
characteristics can be considered prototypically sexual behaviours, while those with barely any
such characteristics are bound to be borderline cases. To determine a behaviour’s place on this
wide spectrum between prototypes and borderline cases, one needs as much information as
possible about the behaviour at hand—the context in which it occurs, the function it fulfils in
that context, the nature of the accompanying behaviours and mental states, and so on.
6 Conclusion
Is there such thing as animal homosexuality? Some animal scientists believe there isn’t. In this
paper I sketched some of their arguments, as they revolve around two philosophical issues: the
problem of other minds and the problem of anthropomorphism. I also attempted to counter
these arguments by indicating that there are good reasons to believe that nonhuman animals are
indeed minded creatures, that they can in fact be said to be capable of having many, though not
all, mental states that are relevantly similar to those we associate with human homosexuality,
and finally that, even though it may at times be difficult to ascertain the sexual nature of animal
behaviours and mental states, due to the vagueness of the concept of sexuality, one should be
careful in desexualising such behaviours and mental states.
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